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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
I 
YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS, j 
LC, a Utah limited liability company, I 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
CARLOS MARIN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
I. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a 26 March 2008 Order of the Fourth District Court (Judge 
Samuel McVey) granting Appellee Young Living Essential Oils, LC's motion for partial 
summary judgment and denying Appellant Carlos Marin's motion for partial summary 
judgment (R. 451-462), and the 12 June 2008 Final Judgment of the same lower court in 
favor of Young Living awarding damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and 
attorney's fees and costs, including the costs and fees expending collecting the judgment 
and the costs of appeal (R. 500-505, 563-565). 
Appellee Young Living Essential Oils, LC will be referred to herein as "Young 
Living" and Appellant Carlos Marin as "Marin". 
///// 
///// 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 20080624-CA 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(j), 
and to the Utah Supreme Court's Order effective 17 August 2008 transferring the case to 
this Court. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing cannot circumvent the parol evidence rule to impose new, 
independent duties in an expressly integrated written agreement? This Court 
reviews questions of law for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). This Court reviews the determination that an 
agreement is integrated under a clearly erroneous standard. Bennett v. Huish, 155 P.3d 
917, 925 (Utah App. 2007), citing Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, f 18, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 
2002). 
Marin's Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment preserved this issue for review. (R. 119). 
2. - 3. Did Marin preserve the attorney's fees and costs issues for review? 
"To preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised 'a timely and specific 
objection' before the trial court. We will not address an issue if it is not preserved or if 
the appellant has not established other grounds for seeking review." H. U.F. v. W.P. W. 
P.3d , 2009, WL 304711 (Utah 2009) {quoting State v. Low, 192 P.3d 867 (Utah 
2008) (emphasis added) (Copy at Addendum 1). 
"The standard of review on appeal of [the amount of) a trial court's award of 
attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of discretion." Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R & 
2 
R Group, Inc., 189 P.3d 114 (Utah App. 2008) (citing Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, % 
127, 130 P.3d 325 (Utah 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998)). 
"A trial court's decision to award the prevailing party its costs will be reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard." Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ^  140, 130 P.3d 
325, 351 (Utah 2005), quoting Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, f 4, 16 P.3d 549. 
Marin did not preserve these issues for review. His Objection to Plaintiffs 
Proposed Final Judgment and Fee Affidavit (R. 499) was untimely filed. Rule 7(f)(2), 
Utah R. Civ. P. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Summary Judgment - Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 26 July 2006, Plaintiff/Appellee Young Living Essential Oils, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company ("Young Living"), filed its complaint against 
Defendant/Appellant Carlos Marin ("Marin"), for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, 
quantum meruit, fraud, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
negligent misrepresentation in the Fourth District Court. (R. 1-23). 
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On 18 December 2006, Marin filed his Amended Answer. (R. 52-63). 
On 21 March 2007, Young Living filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
(Breach of Contract Claim) (R. 74) with a supporting Memorandum and accompanying 
affidavits (R. 69-72, 75-105). On 4 April 2007, Marin filed his Response to Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 110-
119), with a supporting affidavit (R. 120-127). On 13 August 2007, Young Living filed 
its Reply and Opposition to Defendant's Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
(R. 130-170; see also Errata at R. 308-311), with supporting affidavits and declarations 
(R. 171-287). On 27 August 2007, Marin filed his Reply (R. 293-295). 
At a 1 October 2007 hearing on the motions, the trial court (Judge Samuel 
McVey) granted Young Living's motion for partial summary judgment on its contract 
claim and denied Marin's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 312). On 26 
March 2008, the trial court signed the Order granting Young Living's motion for partial 
summary judgment and denying Marin's cross-motion for partial summary judgment (R. 
451-462). 
On 27 May 2008, Young Living filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its remaining 
claims against Marin, filed its affidavit of attorney's fees and costs (R. 463-495), and 
submitted a proposed Final Judgment (R. 503-505). 
On 11 June 2008, Marin filed an Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Final Judgment 
and Fee Affidavit (R. 496-499). 
On 12 June 2008, the trial court entered the Order dismissing Young Living's 
remaining claims (R. 500-502) and entered its Final Judgment (R. 503-505). 
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On 14 July 2008, Marin filed his Notice of Appeal (R. 513-514). 
On 4 November 2008, Young Living filed a Motion to Amend Final Judgment 
Nunc Pro Tunc (to correct Young Living's correct name and corporate status from 
"Young Living Essential Oils, Inc., a Utah Corporation" to "Young Living Essential Oils, 
LC, a Utah limited liability company" on the caption of the Final Judgment to conform to 
the caption on the Complaint) (R. 556-558). On 14 November 2008, the trial court 
granted Young Living's motion (R. 561-562) and entered a Final Judgment Amended 
Nunc Pro Tunc (R. 563-565). 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following undisputed facts are taken verbatim from the Court's 26 March 208 
Order (R. 462-458) except that, pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, "Young Living" replaces "Plaintiff," and "Marin" replaces "Defendant" here: 
At Valid Contract 
1. After negotiations, Plaintiff Young Living Essential Oils, LC ("Young Living") 
a Utah corporation, ultimately executed a written agreement ("Agreement") with 
Defendant Carlos Marin ("Marin") on 12 January 2005. 
2. In their Agreement, Marin expressly represented and warranted that he had 
"significant experience as a Distributor/Leader", had "numerous contacts with potential 
Distributor/Leaders" whom he could "bring to the Company and sign as new distributors 
with the Company", and had "successful, favorable experience in providing Services 
such as the duties as contemplated herein." 
3. Paragraph 18, the last paragraph of their Agreement directly above the 
5 
signature blocks, is labeled "Entire Agreement" (underline in original) and states in part: 
"there are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in 
connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein." 
B. Young Living's Obligations 
4. Under paragraph 4 of their Agreement, Young Living agreed to pay Marin 
advance payments of 
$25,000 on execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005); 
$25,000 on 15 February 2005; 
$25,000 on 15 March 2005, and 
$25,000 on 15 April 2005. 
5. According to their Agreement, these advances and other specified performance 
bonuses were to help Marin devote "all his time and attention into [sic] recruiting 
additional distributors underneath him and training them" and were expressly intended 
"to entice [Marin] to quickly build an organization by devoting the necessary time to it. 
Also, [they] will provide him with a quick resource of cash to build the business." 
6. Under paragraphs 4 and 4.1, these advanced amounts were to be offset by any 
payments due Marin for commissions and "Fast Cash" bonuses. 
7. Under paragraph 4.3, Young Living gave Marin a product credit of $5,000 for 
January 2005, and $5,000 for February 2005 "to be used for samples in attracting new 
Distributor/Leaders." 
///// 
///// 
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C Marin's Obligations 
8. Under paragraph 3.3 of their Agreement, Marin agreed to "devote his full time 
and attention to recruiting new Distributor/Leaders" to sell Young Living's productsi 
9. Under paragraph 3.4 of their Agreement, Marin agreed that he would meet the 
following performance guarantees of cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the 
specified dates: 
$5,000 by 15 February 2005; 
$30,000 by 15 March 2005; 
$100,000 by 15 April 2005; 
$300,000 by 15 May 2005; 
$600,000 by 15 June 2005, and 
$900,000 by 15 July 2005. 
10. Paragraph 6.1 of their Agreement provides for Marin's payment of Young 
Living's "loss and damage" and "legal fees" arising from "contravention . . . of any of the 
terms and conditions imposed on [Marin] pursuant to this Agreement." 
D* Young Living's Performance and Marin's Breach 
11. On 12 January 2005, in connection with the execution of their Agreement, 
Young Living paid Marin a $25,000 advance. 
12. On 15 February 2005, Marin met his $5,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales 
volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
13. Accordingly, on 15 February 2005, Young Living paid Marin another 
$25,000 advance. 
7 
ship" sales volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
15. On 15 March 2005, Young Living paid Marin another $15,000 advance based 
on Marin's representation that he would meet his 15 March 2005 perfonnance guarantee 
of $30,000 in cumulative sales volume by 15 April 2005. 
16. On 15 April 2005, Marin had failed to meet his 15 March 2005 $30,000 (let 
alone his 15 April 2005 $100,000) cumulative "auto ship" sales volume performance 
guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
17. Through June 2006, Marin had generated a grand total of less than $36,000 in 
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume. 
E. Damages 
18. Young Living paid Marin $65,000.00 in advances. 
19. In 2005 and 2006, Marin earned a total of $3,637.57 in commissions from 
Young Living. 
20. Marin never earned "Fast Cash" bonus payments. 
21. Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states that the "monies advanced to [Marin] 
will be offset by any payments due [Marin] under the Fast Cash Program as calculated 
below. Also, these payments will be offset by any commission payments due [Marin] 
each month as calculated by the standard commission payout plan. . . . If any of the 
advanced amounts are not repaid by the commission payouts or Fast Cash at the end of 
the guaranteed payments, these amounts will be deducted from any future commission 
payout . . . . " 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Marin argues that his admitted failure to meet agreed-upon performance 
guarantees was excused because of Young Living's prior breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing by failing to provide "marketing tools" by a purported 
deadline. As a result, Marin argues, this Court should reverse the trial court's order 
granting Young Living's motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim. 
Marin makes three supporting arguments: 
(1) He claims his affidavit raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether 
there was an additional central oral term connected with the parties' written agreement; 
(2) He claims the course of dealing between the parties should have been 
considered in connection with whether Young Living breached the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing; and 
(3) He claims the parol evidence rule is not implicated by his affidavit since the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a part of every contract, and his 
affidavit related to breach of that covenant and not to adding an oral term. 
Marin's arguments are without merit based on a single dispositive undisputed 
material fact, and a bright-line rule of law. The dispositive undisputed material fact: the 
parties' contract contained a clear integration clause. 
After the trial court ruled in this matter, the Utah Supreme Court announced a 
bright-line dispositive rule that applies here: "[I]n the face of a clear integration clause, 
extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is not admissible on the question of 
9 
integration." Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20 f 17, 182 P„3d 326, 332 
(Utah 2008). 
Marin failed to preserve the attorney's fees and costs issues for appeal 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT, UNDER 
EITHER THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING OR THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, MARIN'S AFFIDAVIT 
WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE TO ADD A TERM TO THE PARTIES' 
EXPRESSLY INTEGRATED WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
Marin claims this Court should reverse the trial court's order granting Young 
Living's motion for summary judgment for Marin's breach of contract because his 
affidavit raised a genuine issue of material fact. Marin claims the disputed issue of fact is 
whether Young Living orally agreed to supply Marin with the "marketing tools" 
necessary for him to satisfy his performance guarantees. Marin asserts that Young 
Living's failure to supply such "marketing tools" by a purported deadline constituted "a 
prior material breach of its obligation of good faith and fair dealing which excused Mr. 
Marin from further performance under the Agreement, and specifically excused him from 
his performance guarantees." (App. Br. 14-19). 
Notwithstanding his assertions to the contrary, Marin offered his affidavit not as 
evidence of the parties' course of dealing in connection with Young Living's covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, but as evidence of an additional term not included in the 
parties' expressly integrated written agreement. The trial court correctly concluded that 
Marin's affidavit was not admissible for that purpose under either the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing or the parol evidence rule. 
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1. This Court Can Summarily Affirm Based on a Single Undisputed Material 
Fact and a Recent Dispositive Holding by the Utah Supreme Court. Since the trial 
court ruled, the Utah Supreme Court announced a bright-line rule that is dispositive here. 
Thus, Marin's appeal can be summarily disposed of based on a single undisputed material 
fact and a single dispositive rule of law. 
a. The Dispositive Undisputed Material Fact: The Parties' Contract 
Contained a Clear Integration Provision. This is the last paragraph of the parties' 9-
page Agreement directly over Marin's signature: 
Entire Agreement. 
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties hereto 
pertaining to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and 
contemporaneous agreements and understandings of the Parties, and there 
are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties 
in connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth 
herein. No supplement, modification, amendment, waiver or termination of 
this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing and signed by 
the Parties hereto.. . . 
(R. 6, copy at Addendum 2). As the trial court noted, Marin has failed to address, 
explain, or dispute this or any other provision in his Agreement. Indeed, Marin 
acknowledged in the court below that this integration clause was part of a "valid" 
Agreement and that the terms "are what they are".1 
In short, this is a clear integration provision. 
1
 See R. 63 H 2 and 62 f 5; see also R. 118-119 ffi[ 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(A) and (B), Utah R. 
Civ. P. (R. 6 118 (emphasis added); R. 101 ^ 3; R. 118-119 ffi[ 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah 
R. Civ. P.; cf R. 21 ffi[ 10-11, 14; R. 63 % 2 and 621f 5). 
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b. The Dispositive Rule of Law: Where There Is A Clear Integration 
Provision, No Extrinsic Evidence of a Separate Oral Agreement Is Admissible, In 
May 2008, the Utah Supreme Court expressly held: "[I]n the face of a clear integration 
clause, extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is not admissible on the question 
of integration;' Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20 \ 17, 182 P.3d 326, 332 
(Utah 2008).2 
The Utah Supreme Court's holding is dispositive here. Since the parties' 
Agreement contained a clear integration clause, Marin's affidavit is not admissible to add 
an oral term to the parties' written agreement. 
This Court should summarily affirm and award Young Living its fees and costs of 
appeal. 
2. Even Under Prior Law, the Trial Court Was Correct in Excluding Marin's 
Affidavit as Evidence to Add an Oral Term to the Parties' Expressly Integrated 
Written Agreement, 
a. The Proper Legal Framework for Analysis. To determine whether the trial 
court's conclusion was correct under the prior law, it is important to understand the 
proper legal framework for analysis: 
(1) Contract interpretation is a question of law: "[Interpretation of a contract 
is a question of law." Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 561 
2
 Tangren applies retroactively: "The general rule from time immemorial is that the 
ruling of a court is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and 
prospectively." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984). Marin carmot argue that 
12 
(Utah 1983), citing Morris v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 
1983). 
(2) Threshold question: Is the agreement integrated? As a preliminary matter, 
before a trial court can consider evidence of terms outside a parties' written agreement, it 
must consider whether that agreement is integrated. Hall v. Process Instruments & 
Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 1995) (Utah Supreme Court affirmed where trial 
judge excluded parol evidence offered to add terms to a written agreement that was 
complete on its face), citing Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). 
"An agreement is integrated where the parties thereto adopt a writing or writings 
as the final and complete expression of the agreement." Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT 
App 361, Tfl7, 58 P.3d 854 (Utah App. 2002)(quotations and citation omitted). 
(3) Whether a contract is completely integrated is a preliminary question that 
may be resolved in summary judgment: AGI v. First Affiliated Securities, 912 F.2d 
1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment affirmed where, under Utah law, trial 
judge refused to consider parol evidence of purported additional oral terms of expressly 
integrated written agreement). 
(4) Admissibility and integration are questions of law: "Whether evidence is 
admissible is a question of law, which we review for correctness, incorporating a clearly 
erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of whether the 
parties adopted a writing as a complete integration of their agreement." Bennett v. Huish, 
he justifiably relied on prior decisions such as Hall since Marin argues that the parol 
evidence rule does not even apply here. Id; App. Br. at 23. 
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155 P.3d 917, 925 % 18 (Utah App. 2007), citing Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, |18, 44 
P.3d 742 (Utah 2002). 
(5) The trial court considers all relevant evidence including the parties' 
course of dealing to determine whether an agreement is integrated: Before Tangren, 
a trial court was required to consider all relevant evidence, including the parties' course 
of dealing, in determining whether an agreement was integrated. Hall v. Process 
Instruments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 1995). If there is a clear 
integration clause, the parties' course of dealing may not be used to add implied terms. 
Indeed, the three "course of dealing" cases cited by Marin about implied terms 
(App. Br. 19-23) are distinguishable: none of the contracts involved in those cases 
contained an integration clause. See Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998); St. 
Benedicts Dev. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 2001); Andalex 
Resources, Inc. v Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah App. 1994). 
As the supreme court pointed out in Tangren, Hall did not contain an integration 
clause either: "Thus, we were not presented with the issue we face in this case: whether 
extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement regarding the contract is admissible in the 
face of a clear integration clause." Tangren, 182 P.2d at 331 n.19. The supreme court 
concluded: "To the extent our statements in Bullfrog Marina, Inc., Eie, Spears, and Hall 
suggest that extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is admissible where the 
contract contains a clear integration clause, we disavow them." Id. 
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(6) Is there ambiguity or fraud? If an agreement is integrated, and if the 
defendant fails to claim ambiguity or fraud, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add a 
term to an integrated written contract. Hall, 890 P.2d at 1026-27. 
(7) The covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be construed to add 
new terms to a parties5 agreement: "[T]he covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
cannot be construed to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the 
parties." Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah App. 1994), 
citing Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 48, 55 (Utah 1991); accord Brown, 973 P.2d 
at 955 ("a contrary holding would 'establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed 
upon by the parties'"). 
b. The Trial Court's Application of the Law: Review of All Relevant 
Evidence. In applying this legal analysis, the trial court stated: "Based on all the 
relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the Court concludes as a preliminary matter 
that the parties intended their Agreement to be a complete integration and the final 
expression of their agreement." (R. 455). The trial court's conclusion was correct. 
(1) The Parties' Contract Contains An Express Integration Provision. The 
trial court first noted that its determination was 
based in part on the express integration provision direction over [Marin's] 
signature in the Agreement itself which [Marin] has neither disputed nor 
explained. Although not conclusive3, the Court finds this express provision 
particularly persuasive. 
As discussed above, the Tangren case now makes a clear integration clause conclusive: 
"[I]n the face of a clear integration clause, extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement 
is not admissible on the question of integration." Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 
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Id. The trial court was referring to the last paragraph of the parties' 9-page Agreement: 
Entire Agreement. 
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties hereto 
pertaining to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and 
contemporaneous agreements and understandings of the Parties, and there 
are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties 
in connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth 
herein. No supplement, modification, amendment, waiver or termination of 
this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing and signed by 
the Parties hereto.. . . 
(R. 6, copy at Addendum 2). As the trial court noted, Marin has failed to address, 
explain, or dispute this or any other provision in his Agreement. Indeed, Marin 
acknowledged in the court below that this integration clause was part of a "valid" 
Agreement and that the terms "are what they are".4 As discussed above, since Tangren 
the existence of this clear integration clause is now dispositive and would end the 
analysis: no extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement would be admissible. 
Tangren, 2008 UT 20 ] 17, 182 P.3d 326, 332 (Utah 2008). 
(2) It Is Unreasonable That Such A Crucial Term Would Be Omitted. The 
trial court also noted that 
the Agreement itself sets out in detail the rights and obligations of the 
parties, including various deadlines for their performance. It therefore begs 
the question: if, as [Marin] contends, the purported term that [Young 
UT 20 U 17, 182 P.3d 326, 332 (Utah 2008). But Tangren was decided after the trial 
court's ruling. 
4
 See R. 63 12 and 62 Tf 5; see also R. 118-119 ^ 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(A) and (B), Utah R. 
Civ. P. (R. 6 If 18 (emphasis added); R. 101 f 3; R. 118-119 ^ 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah 
R. Civ. P.; c fR. 21 ffif 10-11, 14; R. 63 f 2 and 6215). 
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Living] breached was so critical to [Marin's] performance, why was it not 
included in the parties' Agreement? 
(R. 455.) 
(3) The Parties' Course of Dealing Belies Marin's Current Assertions and 
Confirms that Young Living Acted in Good Faith. As for the parties' course of 
dealing, the trial court noted that 
the email communications between [Marin] and [Young Living] submitted 
to the Court are devoid of any reference by [Marin] to [Young Living's] 
breach of this purported critical term. The Court finds particularly 
persuasive an email exchange between [Marin] and [Young Living's] 
general counsel on February 3, 2005, two days after the deadline [Marin] 
contends that Plaintiff was to provide promised "marketing tools". Instead 
of complaining about how [Young Living's] recent breach would prevent 
his further performance, [Marin] represented that he could expand [Young 
Living's] business into several foreign markets. Indeed, in the submissions 
before the Court, there is no written notice of the purported breach to give 
[Young Living] the contractually-required 10-day opportunity to cure. 
(R. 455-454). The trial court added: 
The Court notes that oral representations of additional terms have been 
accepted by other courts notwithstanding an integration clause in a written 
agreement. But those cases are most often in the context of a construction 
contract where the performance of the parties manifests their agreement or 
consent to "extras" beyond a written agreement. Therefore, those cases are 
distinguishable. 
(R. 454). In addition, the undisputed facts disclose that, in compliance with its obligation 
of good faith and fair dealing, and based on Marin's assertion that he would make up for 
his admitted breach of a performance guarantee, Young Living paid an advance to Marin 
after Marin's breach (IflU4. and 15., supra at 7-8). 
(4) Marin's Assertions About A Purported Oral Agreement Are Indefinite 
and Unclear, The trial court also identified that Marin's "assertions of [Young Living's] 
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representations lack foundation as to the circumstances including who made the 
purported representation or representations and when such representations were made.v 
Id. Marin's assertions were also directly contradicted by the affidavits of the Young 
Living executives who would have made the claimed representations. (R. 173, 179-180.) 
The trial court concluded: 
In sum, based on all the relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the 
Court rejects [Marin's] assertions that the parties intended to be bound by terms 
not found in their written Agreement and concludes as a threshold matter that the 
parties' Agreement was integrated. 
Id. 
(5) Marin's Reliance on The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is 
Misplaced. Finally, the trial court concluded that Marin's claim of Young Living's 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "is misplaced" since "[i]t is 
well settled that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to 
impose new, independent duties in a written agreement." (R. 456). In Ihis regard, the 
trial court quoted Slicex, Inc. v. Aeroflex Colorado Springs, Inc., 2006 WL 2927768 
(D.Utah) n.l: 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is "implied in contracts 
'to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract'" ... '[T]he 
doctrine of good faith and fair dealing does not serve to import new 
obligations into a contract. It merely controls how the obligations stated 
within the contract are to be performed.'" 
(Case cites omitted) (Copy at Addendum 3). 
(6) Marin's Claims Necessarily Implicated the Parol Evidence Rule. The trial 
court also concluded that Marin's claim that Young Living "breached a purported oral 
ia 
term necessarily implicates the parol evidence rule." Id. The trial court then quoted Hall, 
890 P.2d at 1026-1027, noting "[i]t is well settled that" 
the [parol evidence] rule operates, in the absence of fraud or other 
invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous 
conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract. 
Id. (italics in original; citing inter alia Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1192 
(Utah 1981); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 213-14 (1981)). (R. 456). 
(7) Marin Made No Claim of Fraud or Ambiguity. Since Marin did not claim 
either fraud or ambiguity, the trial court correctly concluded that his "assertions offered 
for the purpose of adding to the terms of the parties' integrated Agreement must be 
excluded. Hah, 890 P.2d at 1026-27." (R. 454). 
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded under both the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and the parol evidence rule that, based on all of the relevant 
evidence in the record, Marin's affidavit was not admissible to add a term to the parties' 
integrated Agreement. Since the trial court's conclusion was correct, and its finding that 
the parties' Agreement was integrated was not clearly erroneous, this Court should affirm 
the award of summary judgment against Marin on Young Living's breach of contract 
claim and the final judgment. 
B. MARIN FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 
FOR APPEAL 
The Utah Supreme Court recently instructed 
[t]o preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised "a timely 
and specific objection" before the trial court. We will not address an issue 
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if it is not preserved or if the appellant has not established other grounds for 
seeking review. 
K U.F. v. W.P. W. P.3d , 2009, WL 304711 (Utah 2009) (quoting State v. Low, 
192 P.3d 867 (Utah 2008) (emphasis added) (Copy at Addendum 1). 
In this case, Marin did not raise a timely objection to Young Living's Proposed 
Judgment or to Young Living's Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(f)(2), "[objections to the proposed order' shall be filed 
within five days after service." Here, Young Living filed and served its Proposed Final 
Judgment and Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees on 27 May 2008. (R. 505, 492). Following 
this Marin was allowed five (5) days, plus three (3) days for service by mail (Rule 6(e)), 
by which to file any objection to the Proposed Final Judgment including the Affidavit of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, making any objection due on 6 June 2008. Marin did not file 
his objection with the trial court until 11 June 2008. (R. 499). 
Thus, Marin did not timely object to Young Living's Proposed Final Judgment 
and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs. By failing to do so, Marin failed to preserve 
the issue of the reasonableness of Young Living's attorney's fees for appeal. 
C. MARIN FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF COSTS FOR APPEAL 
As detailed above, Marin did not timely file an objection to Plaintiffs Proposed 
Final Judgment or Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs and therefore did not preserve 
the issue of costs for appeal. 
Moreover, even under the more expansive Rule 54 d(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
5 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 defines "Judgment" as used in the rules as a 
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Procedure, Marin failed to timely object to the itemized bill of costs. Under Rule 54 d(2), 
"[a] party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the 
memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court." 
As noted above, Marin did not file his objection to the Proposed Final Judgment or 
Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs until 11 June 2008, some 15 days after being served 
with Plaintiffs Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs. (R. 499). 
Based on Rules 6(a) and 6(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any objection to the 
costs bill was required to be filed by 9 June 2008. Because Marin did not timely file his 
objection to costs, the issue of costs has not been preserved for appeal. 
In any event, even if the Court finds Marin did preserve this issue, the Agreement 
between the parties provided for the recovery of all costs, charges and expenses. 
Paragraph 6.1 of the Agreement reads as follows: 
MARIN herby agrees to indemnify and save Company and hold harmless 
Company in respect to all causes of action, liabilities, costs, charges and 
expenses, loss and damage (including consequential loss) suffered or 
incurred by Company (including legal fees) arising from any willful or 
grossly negligent act or omission of MARIN or his employees, servants and 
agents or arising from contravention by MARIN of any of its employees 
servants and agents of any of the terms and conditions imposed on MARIN 
pursuant to this Agreement. 
(R. 9; emphasis added). Thus, even if Marin preserved this issue for appeal, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding as costs Young Living's expenditures for 
photocopies, overnight mail, courier, postage, and online research. Based on the 
language of the Agreement, Plaintiff is entitled to collect all costs, charges and expenses 
decree and any order from which an appeal lies. 
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related to Marin's contravention of the terms and conditions imposed on Marin pursuant 
to the Agreement. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Under both Tangren and the controlling law at the time it ruled, the trial court 
properly ruled that Marin's affidavit was could not be admitted to add an oral term to the 
parties' expressly integrated written agreement. 
Marin did not preserve the attorney's fees and costs issues for appeal. 
The trial court should be affirmed, and Young Living should be awarded its costs 
and fees, including on appeal. 
( $y 
Respectfully submitted thisvPjfaay of April 2009. 
FILLMORE SPENCER LLL 
•£*-
Jarnard N. Madsen 
Attorneys for Appellee Young Living 
Essential Oils, LC 
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Background: Putative father filed motion to inter-
vene in adoption proceeding Following a hearing, 
the Fourth District, Provo Department, Lynn W 
Davis, J , granted adoptive parent's motions to dis-
miss and strike putative father's motion to inter-
vene, and putative father appealed The Court of 
Appeals certified the case for immediate transfer 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durrant, Associate 
C J , held that 
(1) putative father's arguments on appeal were not 
moot, 
(2) putative father did not comply with Arizona re-
quirements to preserve his parental rights, as re-
quired in order to qualify for exception to Utah stat-
ute that denied putative fathers who did not register 
with Office of Vital Statistics the right to contest 
adoptions, 
(3) evidence was sufficient to establish that putative 
father had reason to believe that mother had moved 
to Utah and thus was required to register with Of-
fice of Vital Statistics in order to preserve his par-
ental rights and intervene in the adoption proceed-
ing, 
(4) Arizona paternity order was entitled to full faith 
and credit, but 
(5) error of trial court in concluding that Arizona 
order was not entitled to full faith and credit was 
harmless, as such order had no bearing on putative 
father's right to challenge adoption, 
(6) trial court could make findings of fact without 
providing putative father with an evidentiary hear-
ing, and 
(7) putative father's appeal was not frivolous 
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the parties did not present any evidence, and the tri-
al court relied on facts in the record to make its 
findings Rules Civ Proc , Rule 43(b) 
[21] Costs 102 €^260(5) 
102 Costs 
102X On Appeal or Error 
102k259 Damages and Penalties for Frivol-
ous Appeal and Delay 
102k260 Right and Grounds 
102k260(5) k Nature and Form of 
Judgment, Action, or Proceedings for Review Most 
Cited Cases 
Putative father's appeal of trial court order granting 
adoptive parents' motions to dismiss and strike pu-
tative father's motion to intervene in adoption pro-
ceeding was not frivolous, and thus adoptive par-
ents were not entitled to their attorney fees on ap-
peal, though putative father did not prevail, Su-
preme Court found that putative father's appeal was 
not moot as argued by adoptive parents, though pu-
tative father failed to preserve two issues he raised 
on appeal he raised other issues that were properly 
before the Supreme Court, putative father's argu-
ment that had no reason to know that mother was in 
Utah was not made in bad faith, and putative fath-
er's challenge to the lack of an evidentiary hearing 
was made in good faith Rules App Pioc , Rule 
33(b) 
Hutch U Falc, Provo, Nathan E Burdsal, Salt Lake 
City, for petitioners 
H Mifflin Williams, III, Salt Lake City, Claudia 
McGee Henry, Los Angeles, CA, for respondent 
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On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
*1 U 1 In this case, W.P.W. ("Putative Father") 
challenges the adoption of Baby Girl Stine 
("B.G.S."), arguing that the district court erred in 
ordering the adoption of B.G.S. without his con-
sent. H.U.F. and G.F. ("Adoptive Parents") defend 
the district court's order by arguing that the Putative 
Father's consent to the adoption was not necessary 
because he failed to comply with the statutory re-
quirements that give a putative father the right to 
contest an adoption. 
K 2 Specifically, the parties raise the following is-
sues on appeal: 
(1) Whether the Putative Father's appeal is moot be-
cause he appealed only one of two dispositive or-
ders; 
(2) Whether Utah's statutory scheme for adoptions 
violated the Putative Father's due process and 
equal protection rights, and whether these consti-
tutional challenges were preserved; 
(3) Whether the Putative Father complied with Utah 
Code section 78-30-4.14, which establishes the 
requirements a putative father must meet before 
he may contest an adoption; 
(4) Whether the district court should have granted 
full faith and credit to Arizona's Paternity Order; 
(5) Whether the district court should have held an 
evidentiary hearing; and 
(6) Whether the Putative Father's appeal is frivol-
ous, warranting the award of attorney fees to the 
Adoptive Parents. 
H 3 We affirm the district court's decision. 
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BACKGROUND 
f 4 On or about September 22, 2005, while the 
Birth Mother was pregnant with B.G.S., she served 
two men with notice that she intended to place her 
baby for adoption through LDS Family Services in 
Mesa, Arizona. The notice stated that if its recipient 
wished to assert parental rights to the baby, he was 
required to initiate a paternity action pursuant to 
Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106 within thirty 
days of receipt of the notice. The notice also in-
cluded the full text of Arizona Revised Statute sec-
tion 8-106. In addition, the Birth Mother published 
public notices in Arizona newspapers four times 
over a period of four weeks between September and 
October 2005. The public notices were addressed 
to, "William Patrick Wilks or Nathaniel Davis or 
John Doe." 
K 5 In response, the Putative Father filed a Notice 
of Claim of Paternity with the Arizona Office of 
Vital Records on September 29, 2005. This filing 
placed the Putative Father's name on the Putative 
Father Registry in Arizona. As a registrant, the Pu-
tative Father had the right to be identified by the vi-
tal statistics office if the office were to receive a 
search letter regarding the child whom the Putative 
Father claimed he fathered. Thereafter, the entity 
assisting in the placement of the child for adoption 
would be responsible for notifying the Putative 
Father of any legal proceedings regarding the child. 
The vital statistics office indicated in a letter to the 
Putative Father that he must follow the provisions 
of Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106 to estab-
lish paternity. 
f 6 In February 2006, the Birth Mother filed a peti-
tion with an Arizona justice court seeking a protect-
ive order against the Putative Father. A hearing was 
held on the matter on February 7. At the hearing, 
counsel representing the Birth Mother stated that 
the Birth Mother "went to Utah to get away from 
[the Putative Father], and to be up there, and that's 
where she is, and there's no need for [the Putative 
Father] to be allowed to harass her."The Putative 
Father responded, "Yes, um [the Birth Mother] told 
© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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me when she moved to Utah " 
*2 T| 7 The Putative Father never registered with the 
Utah Office of Vital Statistics as a putative father 
f 8 On February 15, 2006, one hundred and forty-
five days after being served with notice that the 
Birth Mother intended to place her baby for adop-
tion, the Putative Father filed a petition for patern-
ity with the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa 
County Because the Putative Father failed to prop-
erly serve the Birth Mother, the petition was not 
granted 
H 9 B G S was born in Utah on March 4, 2006 
Two days later, in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah, the Birth Mother willingly relinquished all 
of her parental rights and responsibilities to the Ad-
optive Parents The Birth Mother also stated to the 
district court that she was not, nor had she ever 
been, married to the natural father of B G S and 
that the identity of the father was unknown Fur-
ther, she stated that the natural father had not initi-
ated a paternity action m Utah, despite having actu-
al notice that the Birth Mother had moved to Utah 
FN1 
and planned to give birth to the baby in Utah 
K 10 On March 15, 2006, the Adoptive Parents filed 
a petition for temporary custody and guardianship 
and a verified petition for adoption, wherein they 
indicated that "[p]ursuant to Utah Code Ann § 
78-30-4 14, the consent of the natural mother is the 
only consent required in order for the Court to grant 
the instant petition "They further stated that the 
presumed natural father had actual notice and 
knowledge that the Birth Mother resided m Utah 
and that she intended to give birth in Utah They 
also stated that the presumed natural father had not 
registered with the Office of Vital Statistics in the 
Utah Department of Health, nor had he begun a pa-
ternity proceeding in the State of Utah On March 
17, 2006, the district court granted the Adoptive 
Parents "full and complete custody and guardian-
ship of [B G S ] until such time when the Court is-
sues a final order concerning Petitioner's Petition 
for Adoption " 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West 
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f 11 On April 11, 2006, the Putative Father again 
petitioned the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa 
County for a declaration of paternity Again, he 
failed to properly serve the Birth Mother 
K 12 On July 25, 2006, in the Superior Court of Ari-
zona, the Putative Father filed a Voluntary Petition 
for Order of Paternity signed by the Birth Mother 
In an order dated August 2, 2006, the Arizona court 
"note[d]" that this voluntary petition "resolv[ed] the 
paternity issue " The court also noted that it lacked 
jurisdiction to determine custody or child support 
and ordered that the matter be transferred to Utah 
for further proceedings 
H 13 On July 27, 2006, the Putative Father reques-
ted that the Utah court open the sealed Utah file re-
garding the adoption proceedings Then, in the Utah 
court on September 1, 2006, the Putative Father 
filed an mtervenor's response to the petition for ad-
option In an affidavit filed with the court, the Pu-
tative Father stated that the Birth Mother told him 
"verbally and by e-mail that she would not give 
affiant's baby up for adoption and that she would 
always keep in touch with affiant "Further, the Pu-
tative Father stated in the affidavit that he "had no 
knowledge whatsoever, and received no notice 
whatsoever that [the Birth Mother] resided in Utah 
and intended to give birth to [B G S ] in Utah " 
*3 f 14 On August 31, 2006, and again on Novem-
ber 27, 2006, the Birth Mother submitted an affi-
davit stating to the Utah court that she never gave 
the Putative Father notice that she had moved to 
Utah or planned to give birth in Utah With the 
second affidavit, the Birth Mother included an e-
mail that she had sent to the Putative Father on Feb-
ruary 14, 2006, one week following the protective 
order hearing The e-mail stated, "[my parents] 
made me tell all my friends and some family that I 
moved to Utah when I really didn't, nor do I have 
any intentions of moving to Utah " 
K 15 On December 12, 2006, the Adoptive Parents 
moved to dismiss the Putative Father's objection to 
the adoption and motion to intervene On February 
Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
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2, 2007, the district court held a hearing on the mat-
ter Counsel for the Putative Father requested that 
the matter be argued only on the law and objected 
to an evidentiary argument The court declined to 
determine the type of hearing and, instead, left the 
matter up to counsel At the hearing, the parties did 
not present any evidence The Putative Father was 
present, but his counsel did not call him to testify 
K 16 On April 17, 2007, the district court issued one 
ruling that granted the Motion to Strike and the Mo-
tion to Dismiss In the ruling, the district court 
barred the affidavits submitted by the Birth Mother, 
finding that they contradicted "the law of the case" 
and were obtained unethically Next, the court de-
clined to give full faith and credit to the Arizona 
court's statement regarding the Putative Father's pa-
ternity, finding that the Arizona court lacked juris-
diction to issue an order of paternity, the court also 
highlighted additional problems with the order it-
self Finally, the court ruled that the Putative Father 
failed to comply with the Utah statutory require-
ments for out-of-state putative fathers Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that the Putative Father 
"lackfed] standing to challenge this adoption," and 
"Petitioners' Motion to Strike the Objection and to 
Dismiss the Motion to Intervene is hereby granted " 
K 17 The Putative Father appealed, and the court of 
appeals heard oral argument in the case After oral 
argument, but before any decision issued m this 
case, the court of appeals issued a split decision in 
FN2 In re KC I Concerned that its decision in this 
case might conflict with its decision m KCJ the 
court of appeals certified this case for immediate 
transfer to us, pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 43(a) In KCJ, the court of appeals 
held that where the district court becomes aware of 
a putative father's interest and desire to participate 
in the adoption proceeding, the court should allow 
the father to participate, at least to the extent of lit-
igating the legitimacy of his right to contest the ad-
option We need not reach the issue presented 
in KCJ, however, because the Adoptive Parents 
have not challenged the Putative Father's right to 
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adjudicate whether he may contest the adoption of 
B G S Rather, the Adoptive Parents make substant 
lve arguments regarding whether the Putative Fath 
er has the right to contest the adoption 
*4 ^ 18 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
section 78A-3-102(3)(b) (2008) 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[l][2][3]f 19 The Putative Father challenges the 
district court's interpretation of Utah and Arizona 
statutes, the district court's finding that the Putative 
Father failed to comply with Utah and Arizona stat 
utes, and the constitutionality of Utah's statutory re 
quirements for putative fathers to establish parental 
rights We review a district court's interpretation of 
a statute for correctness We leview a district 
court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous 
standard And we review a distnct court's ruling 
regarding a statute's constitutionality for correct 
FNo 
ness 
ANALYSIS 
f 20 As threshold issues, we first address (1) 
whether the Putative Father's appeal is moot, and 
(2) whether the Putative Fathei preserved a due 
process and an equal protection challenge Holding 
that the appeal is not moot but that the Putative 
Father failed to preserve a due process and an equal 
protection challenge, we then address (3) whethei 
the Putative Father complied with Utah Code sec 
tion 78-30-4 15 (2005), and (4) whether the 
district court should have given full faith and credil 
to the Arizona court's paternity order Finally, we 
turn to (5) whether the district ccurt should have 
held an evidentiary hearing, and (6) whether the Pu-
tative Father's appeal is frivolous, warranting attor-
ney fees 
I THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S CLAIMS ARE 
NOT MOOT BECAUSE HE CHALLENGED THE 
SUBSTANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
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ONLY RULING 
[4]K 21 An argument is moot "[i]f the requested ju-
dicial relief cannot affect the rights of the 
litigants " 
[5jfl[ 22 The Adoptive Parents argue that the Putat-
ive Father's arguments on appeal are moot because 
they only address one of two dispositive orders by 
the district court Particularly, the Adoptive Parents 
argue that the Putative Father only contests the dis-
trict court's order granting the Motion to Dismiss 
Alleged Biological Father's Objection and Motion 
to Intervene ("Motion to Dismiss"), without con-
testing the district court's order granting the Motion 
to Strike the Objection and Motion to Intervene 
("Motion to Strike") The Adoptive Parents state 
that these motions served different purposes The 
Motion to Dismiss asserted that the Putative Father 
failed to establish "that he is entitled to any interest 
or right to intervene "The Motion to Strike asserted 
that the Putative Father's attempt to intervene was 
FN9 based upon a false assertion of a material fact 
and should therefore be stricken 
K 23 The Putative Father argues in his reply brief 
that in his opening brief he did challenge the court's 
order granting the Motion to Strike In his opening 
brief, the Putative Father challenged the district 
court's finding that the Putative Father had know-
ledge that the Birth Mother was in Utah Although 
this challenge to the Motion to Strike is not exph-
cit-nowhere does the Putative Father state that he is 
challenging the Motion to Stnke-the challenge is 
nonetheless substantively briefed Accordingly, we 
hold that the Putative Father challenged the Motion 
to Strike, therefore, the Putative Father's arguments 
on appeal are not moot 
II THE PUTATIVE FATHER FAILED TO PRE-
SERVE HIS DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PRO-
TECTION CHALLENGES 
*5 [6]K 24 The Adoptive Parents contend that the 
Putative Father failed to preserve a due process 
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challenge and an equal protection challenge in the 
district court They are correct 
[7]U 25 The preservation requirement is found in 
rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Piocedure, which provides, in relevant part, that for 
each issue raised on appeal, an appellant's brief 
must include a "citation to the record showing that 
the issue was preserved in the trial court, or a state-
ment of grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
TN10 preserved in the trial court " To preserve an is-
sue for appeal, the appellant must have raised "a 
timely and specific objection" before the trial 
court We will not address an issue if it is not 
preserved or if the appellant has not established 
FN12 
other grounds for seeking review 
K 26 Rather than advancing grounds upon which we 
may review an unpreserved issue, the Putative 
Father argues that he preserved in the trial court all 
of the issues that he raises on appeal The Putative 
Father's brief makes the following statement re-
garding preservation "The issues raised in this 
brief were preserved by appellant's documents filed 
in the district court, including his Petition and Mo-
tion to Intervene, and by the issues discussed by the 
district court m its Ruling on Motion to Intervene 
and Motion to Dismiss, dated April 17, 
2007 "While the brief does not match record cita-
tions with specific issues raised, it does at 
least reference documents wherein the issues 
should be found 
K 27 Reviewing the documents cited by the Putative 
Father, we conclude that the Putative Father did not 
preserve a due process challenge or an equal pro-
tection challenge The Natural Father's Objection 
and Motion to Intervene as Respondent raises the 
following arguments (1) the Putative Father com-
plied with Utah's statute that sets guidelines for out-
of-state putative fathers to establish their parental 
rights, and (2) he complied with the Arizona re-
quirements for putative fathers to establish their 
parental rights In its ruling, the district court ad-
dressed the following issues (1) whether the Birth 
Mother's affidavits should be barred, (2) whether 
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full faith and credit should be given to Arizona's 
statement of paternity, and (3) whether the Putative 
Father complied with the Utah requirements for 
out-of-state putative fathers to establish paternity 
rights It is clear from our review that neither the 
Putative Father's challenges nor the district court's 
rulings consider a due process or equal protection 
challenge Accordingly, we will not address these 
issues on appeal 
III THE PUTATIVE FATHER DID NOT COM-
PLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH 
CODE SECTION 78-30-4 14 
U 28 Before a putative father may establish the right 
to contest an adoption in Utah, he must meet the re-
quirements outlined in Utah Code section 
78-30-4 14 (Supp2005) One such requirement is 
that the putative father register with the Utah Office 
FN 14 
of Vital Statistics The statute includes an ex-
ception to this requirement, however, if the follow-
ing circumstances are satisfied (1) the putative 
father "resides and has resided in another state 
where the unmarried mother was also located or 
resided," (2) "the mother left that state without no-
tifying or informing the unmarried biological father 
that she could be located in the state of Utah," (3) 
the putative father "through every reasonable 
means, attempted to locate the mother but does not 
know or have reason to know that the mother is 
residing in the state of Utah," and (4) the putative 
father "has complied with the most stringent and 
complete requirements of the state where the moth-
er previously resided or was located, in order to 
protect and preserve his parental interest and right 
in the child in cases of adoption " 
*6 ^ 29 The Putative Father admits that he did not 
comply with the statute's general requirements, but 
he contends that he qualified for the exception The 
district court ruled that the Putative Father did not 
qualify for the exception because he (1) did not 
comply " 'with the most stringent and complete' " 
Arizona requirements " 'in order to protect and pre-
serve his parental interest and right in the child in 
cases of adoption,' " and (2) he knew or had reason 
to know that the Birth Mother could be located in 
Utah We address both of the district court's find-
ings in turn 
A The Putative Father Failed to Comply with the 
Most Stringent and Complete Aruona Requirements 
[8]K 30 The district court reasoned that the Putative 
Father did not comply with the most stringent and 
complete Arizona requirements established in Ari-
zona Revised Statute section 8-106(G) because he 
did not initiate a paternity action within thirty days 
of receiving notice that the Birth Mother intended 
FN16 to give B G S up for adoption Anzona Re-
vised Statute section 8-106(G) provides, in relevant 
part, that each potential father shall be served no-
tice of the planned adoption, and the notice shall in-
form the potential father that his ' failure to file a 
paternity action pursuant to title 25, chapter 6, art-
icle 1," "within thirty days of completion of 
service" of the notice presc nbed by this sec-
tion, "bars the potential father from bringing or 
maintaining any action to assert any interest in the 
child " F N W 
U 31 The Putative Father argues that this language 
does not actually impose any time limits on putat-
ive fathers because the language is couched in 
terms of a requirement that the birth mother include 
the language in her notice to the pulative father He 
further contends that, for policy reasons, the statute 
cannot possibly bar a putative father from establish-
ing paternity at any time, otherwise if the birth 
mother decided not to place the baby for adoption, 
the putative father would be "off the hook for child 
support "Finally, he argues that the notice he re-
ceived was ambiguous and therefoie did not actu-
ally put him on notice of a mandatory thirty-day 
limit to initiate a paternity action 
[9][10][11]U 32 The Putative Father's interpretation 
of the statute is unpersuasive because it produces an 
absurd result and contradicts the plain language of 
the statute When we interpret a stamte, " 'we look 
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first to the statute's plain language to determine its 
FN20 
meaning ' " We read the plain language of a 
statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in 
harmony with other provisions in the same statute 
and with other statutes under the same and related 
FN21 
chapters We seek an interpretation that 
renders all parts of a statute "relevant and meaning-
ful, and interpretations are to be avoided which 
render some part of a provision nonsensical or ab-
, „FN22 
surd 
Tf 33 Contrary to the Putative Father's contention, it 
would be absurd for the Arizona legislature to re-
quire a birth mother to give a putative father notice 
that he had only thirty days to initiate a paternity 
action but then give the putative father unlimited 
time to initiate the action Such a result would 
render meaningless the provision m the required 
notice section Further, the language of section 
8-106 is plain and unambiguously requires a putat-
ive father to initiate a paternity action within thirty 
days of receiving notice of a planned adoption, oth-
erwise, he has no right to contest the adoption This 
interpretation is not refuted by policy, as the Putat-
ive Father contends Limiting the time in which a 
putative father may establish the right to contest an 
adoption does not limit the putative father's finan-
cial obligations with respect to that child if the birth 
mother chooses not to place the child for adoption 
Section 8-106 regards only the right to contest an 
adoption, not any other rights or obligations that a 
putative father may have regarding his child 
*7 \ 34 The Putative Father's final argument, that 
the notice he received was ambiguous, is incorrect 
and irrelevant He argues that two paragraphs in the 
notice "contradict each other about whether the 
[Putative Father] must or may initiate a paternity 
proceeding in order to establish interest in the 
child "We hold that the text of the notice was un-
ambiguous In one place the notice did read that the 
Putative Father "may" initiate a paternity action, 
and, in another place, it stated that the Putative 
Father "must" initiate the action within thirty days 
in order to retain a right to contest the adoption 
This language is not ambiguous, it simply clarifies 
that it is not necessary for the Putative Father to ini-
tiate a paternity action if he does not desire to do 
so However, if he does desire to, then he must do 
so within thirty days Even if the notice were am-
biguous, the notice included the text of the statute, 
which indicated that the father must initiate a pa-
ternity action within thirty days of receipt of the no-
tice in order to establish the right to contest the ad-
option Further, when the Putative Father registered 
with the Arizona vital statistics office, he again re-
ceived the text of the statute Therefore, the Putat-
ive Father had sufficient notice of the requirement 
to initiate a paternity action within thirty days of re-
ceipt of the notice of a planned adoption 
Tf 35 We uphold the district court's finding that the 
Putative Father failed to comply with the most 
stringent and complete Arizona requirements The 
Putative Father failed to initiate a paternity action 
within thirty days of receiving notice of a planned 
adoption, as required by section 8-106 
B The Putative Father Knew or Had Reason to 
Know That the Birth Mother was in Utah 
[12]f 36 The district court reasoned that the Putat-
ive Father knew or had reason to know that the 
Birth Mother was in Utah because, at a protective 
order hearing that was held less than thirty days be-
fore B G S was born, the Birth Mother's attorney 
stated that the Birth Mother "went to Utah to get 
away from [the Putative Father], and be up there, 
and that's where she is " The Putative Father re-
sponded, "Yes, um [the Birth Mother] told me 
when she moved to Utah "We will overturn a dis-
trict court's findings of fact only if they are "clearly 
erroneous " 
[13]K 37 The Putative Father argues that he did not 
know that the Birth Mother was in Utah because he 
received an e-mail from the Birth Mother one week 
following the protective order hearing stating that 
she had not moved to Utah To discredit the attor-
ney's statement made at the protective order hear-
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ing, the Putative Father argues, "no reasonable un-
married father, seeking to vindicate his paternity 
rights, would base his actions on the representations 
of the attorney for a woman who has obtained an 
order of protection against him."He also argues that 
he did not know where the Birth Mother was living 
because the protective order prevented him from 
contacting her. 
*8 K 38 Again, the Putative Father's arguments are 
unpersuasive. Utah Code section 78-30-4.14 re-
quires only that a putative father "have reason to 
know" that a birth mother was residing in Utah, not 
that he have actual knowledge. In open court, the 
Putative Father testified that the Birth Mother told 
him that she had moved to Utah. This statement is 
sufficient for the district court to find that the Putat-
ive Father had reason to know that the Birth Mother 
was in Utah. Although the Birth Mother stated a 
week later in an e-mail to the Putative Father that 
she had not moved to Utah, the Putative Father still 
had reason to believe she was in Utah because she 
had previously told him that she was there, her at-
torney told him that she was there, and the Birth 
Mother's statement that she had not "moved" to 
Utah did not necessarily mean that she was not 
staying in Utah until the baby was born and placed 
for adoption. For these reasons, the district court's 
finding that the Putative Father had reason to know 
that the Birth Mother was in Utah is not clearly er-
roneous. 
IV. THE ARIZONA PATERNITY ORDER DOES 
NOT IMPACT THIS CASE BECAUSE IT WAS 
UNTIMELY TO ESTABLISH THE PUTATIVE 
FATHER'S RIGHT TO CONTEST THE ADOP-
TION 
TI 39 The Putative Father argues that "the Arizona 
Order of Paternity prevents the adoption of B.G.S. 
without the [Putative Father's] permission" and that 
the district court erred in not giving full faith and 
credit to the paternity order. We hold that the dis-
trict court did err, but the error was harmless be-
cause the Arizona paternity order has no impact on 
the Putative Father's unestablished right to contest 
the adoption. 
A. The District Court Committed Harmless Error 
When It Failed to Give Full Faith and Credit to the 
Arizona Paternity Order 
K 40"Pursuant to the United States Constitution, 
'Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceed-
ings of every other State.'" " Specifically, we 
"give full faith and credit to a declaration of patern-
ity or denial of paternity effective in another state if 
the declaration or denial has been signed and is oth-
erwise in compliance with the law of the other 
f f „FN26 state. 
[14]U 41 The district court declined to give full 
faith and credit to the Arizona paternity order be-
cause the district court found that "the Arizona 
Court now recognizes that it lacked jurisdiction," 
and "[t]his Court, not the State of Arizona, has ex-
clusive jurisdiction regarding custody of 
[B.G.S.]."FN27 
[15][161K 42 As to matters of jurisdiction, a judg-
ment is entitled to full faith and credit "if the same 
issue as to jurisdiction was raised in the foreign 
FN2 8 
court and adjudicated therein." " In this case, the 
Arizona court did take testimony and consider its 
jurisdiction. The Arizona court stated as follows in 
its order: 
After discussion with the parties present, the 
Court elicits testimony under oath on the record 
in open court that the minor child ... does not 
reside in the state of Arizona and has not resided 
in the state of Arizona for the past six (6) months. 
*9 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-1031, this Court does 
not have jurisdiction to determine custody at this 
time. 
(Emphasis added.) 
\ 43 However, the Arizona court did not find that it 
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lacked jurisdiction to issue a paternity order, rather 
the court stated that the Voluntary Petition for Or-
der of Paternity "resolv[es] the paternity issue " 
The court then ordered the matter transferred to 
Utah "for all further proceedings " A lack of juris-
diction as to a custody determination does not 
equate to a lack of jurisdiction as to a paternity de-
termination A "child custody determination" is 
"any judgment, decree or other order of a court, in-
cluding a permanent, temporary, initial and modi-
fication order, for legal custody, physical custody 
or visitation with respect to a child " A de-
termination that an individual is the biological fath-
er of a child is not a determination that the biolo-
gical father has custody or visitation rights with re-
spect to that child Accordingly, the Arizona court 
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to determine 
custody but not to determine paternity 
[17][18]f 44 Being aware that the Arizona court 
had itself concluded that it had jurisdiction, the 
Utah district court erred m addressing the question 
of whether the Arizona court, in fact, had jurisdic-
tion However, the error was harmless " 
'[Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently in-
consequential that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that it affected the outcome of the proceedings ' 
FN30 
" In this case, the district court's error in de-
clining to grant the Arizona paternity order full 
faith and credit was harmless because the order has 
no bearing on the Putative Father's right to contest 
the adoption of B G S 
B The Arizona Paternity Order Has No Impact on 
the Putative Father's Right to Contest the Adoption 
ofBGS 
% 45 We hold that a declaration of paternity from 
Arizona does not necessarily establish the right to 
contest an adoption in Arizona Rather, the right to 
contest an adoption is a more narrow right that must 
be established through specified means 
1f 46 In Arizona, a putative father must initiate a pa-
ternity action within thirty days of receiving notice 
of the planned adoption in order to establish the 
FN31 
right to contest an adoption If the putative 
father fails to initiate a paternity action within the 
time specified, then he is barred "from bringing or 
maintaining any action to assert any interest in the 
child " This language is found within the stat-
ute entitled, "Consent to adoption, who shall con-
sent, waiver, consent to the release of information, 
notification to potential fathers " 
[19]^| 47 The Putative Father argues that because 
the Arizona court, having jurisdiction to do so, is-
sued an order declaring him to be B G S 's father, 
he need not meet the thirty-day requirement This is 
not the case This interpretation of Arizona law 
would render the thirty-day requirement meaning-
less Under Arizona law, the right to contest patern-
ity is distinct from the right to contest an adoption 
A putative father may establish paternity at any 
time, but he may only establish the right to contest 
an adoption if (1) he initiates a paternity action 
withm thirty days of receiving notice of a planned 
adoption and (2) that action results in a paternity 
order 
*10 f 48 Accordingly, we can consistently give full 
faith and credit to the Arizona paternity order, but 
nevertheless hold that the Putative Father did not 
establish the right to contest the adoption of 
FN34 B G S In failing to give the paternity order 
full faith and credit, the district court committed er-
ror But that error was harmless because the patern-
ity order alone is insufficient to establish the right 
to contest the adoption 
V THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
FAILING TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEAR-
ING 
[20]K 49 The Putative Father contends that the dis-
trict court erred in finding facts without holding an 
evidentiary hearing 
f 50 Pursuant to rule 43(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedme, "[w]hen a motion is based on facts 
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not appearing of record the court may hear the mat-
ter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, 
but the court may direct that the matter be heard 
wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions " 
T| 51 In this case, the court provided the parties the 
opportunity to present evidence On February 2, 
2007, the district court held a hearing on the matter 
Counsel for the Putative Father requested that the 
matter be argued only on the law and objected to an 
evidentiary argument The court declined to de-
termine what type of hearing would be held and left 
the matter up to counsel At the hearing, the parties 
did not present any evidence The Putative Father 
was present, but his counsel did not call him to 
testify Subsequently, the court relied on facts in 
the record to make its findings 
^ 52 We hold that the district court did not err in 
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing The court 
provided the parties an opportunity to present evid-
ence, but counsel for the Putative Father declined 
Further, the court relied only on facts in the record 
to make its findings 
VI THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S APPEAL IS NOT 
FRIVOLOUS 
If 53 The Adoptive Parents argue that the Putative 
Father's "appeal is frivolous as it is not groun-
ded "The Adoptive Parents base their argument on 
the following claims (1) the Putative Father's claim 
is moot because he only challenged one of two dis-
positive orders, (2) the Putative Father makes argu-
ments on appeal that he failed to preserve, (3) the 
Putative Father challenges findings of fact without 
fully marshaling the evidence that supports those 
findings, (4) the Putative Father ignores the essen-
tial fact he admitted to the court at the protective 
order heanng-that he knew the Birth Mother went 
to Utah, and (5) the Putative Father challenges the 
lack of an evidentiary hearing when it was counsel 
for the Putative Father who declined an evidentiary 
hearing 
Page 14 
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[2\]% 54 The Adoptive Parents' arguments fail to 
establish that the Putative Father filed a frivolous 
claim A frivolous claim under rule 33(b) of the 
Utah Rules ot Appellate Piocedure"is one that i> 
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, 
or not based on a good faith aigument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law "We address each 
of the Adoptive Parents' arguments in turn 
*11 TI 55 First, the Putative Father did challenge the 
substance of both the Motion to Strike and the Mo 
tion to Dismiss, therefore his claim is not moot 
Second, although the Putative Father failed to pre 
serve two of the issues that he raises on appeal, he 
still raises other issues that are properly before u> 
for consideration Third, the Adopiive Parents have 
not developed a marshaling argument, and failure 
to marshal is not included in nib $3(b)'s definition 
of a frivolous appeal Fourth, the Putative Father 
has admitted that he stated at the protective order 
hearing that he knew, at the tims, that the Birth 
Mother was in Utah He contends, however, that he 
did not know or have reason to know the Birth 
Mother was actually in Utah because following the 
protective order hearing the Birth Mother sent him 
an e-mail wherein she stated that she had not 
moved to Utah While this may not be a strong ar 
gument, it does not appear to be a bad faith argu 
ment, especially in light of the fact that the Putative 
Father has submitted the e-mail for the court's re 
view 
H 56 Finally, the Putative Father's challenge to the 
lack of an evidentiary hearing does not appear to be 
made in bad faith The Putative Father contends 
that the district court ruled on facts that the Putative 
Father did not know were in dispute Particularly, 
the district court found that the copy of the Arizona 
Paternity Order submitted by the Putative Fathei 
was not properly certified The Putative Father ar 
gues on appeal that the district court should have 
provided him an opportunity to submit evidence re 
garding the validity of the Order before the court 
ruled on the Order This appears to be a good faith 
argument, although it is irrelevant because, as wc 
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have stated earlier, the validity of the order has no 
bearing on the outcome of the case. 
H 57 Accordingly, we hold that the Putative Father's 
appeal is not frivolous, even though we uphold the 
district court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
f 58 We affirm the district court's decision. Spe-
cifically, we hold that (1) the appeal is not moot be-
cause the Putative Father challenged the substance 
of the two motions; (2) the due process issue and 
the equal protection issue are not properly before us 
because the Putative Father failed to preserve them; 
(3) the Putative Father failed to comply with Utah 
Code section 78-30-4.14; (4) the district court com-
mitted harmless error when it declined to give the 
Arizona Paternity Order full faith and credit; (5) the 
district court provided the opportunity for an evid-
entiary hearing; and, finally, (6) the Putative Fath-
er's appeal is not frivolous. 
K 59 Affirmed. 
H 60 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice WILKINS, 
Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in 
Associate Chief Justice DURRANT's opinion. 
FN1. At first blush, these statements ap-
pear contradictory-the natural father is un-
known, yet he received actual notice of the 
Birth Mother's move to Utah. They are re-
concilable, however. Because the Birth 
Mother was having sexual relations with 
two different men around the time she be-
came pregnant, she was unsure which man 
was the natural father. Because she gave 
both men actual notice of her move to 
Utah, it is accurate to state that the 
"unknown" father received "actual" notice 
of the Birth Mother's move to Utah. 
FN2. 2008 UT App 152, 184 P.3d 1239. 
FN3.MH 10. 
FN4. Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, f 7, 191 
P.3d4. 
FN5. Glew v. Ohio Saw Bank, 2007 UT 56, 
H 18, 181 P.3d791. 
FN6. In re Adoption of S.L.F., 2001 UT 
App 183,1[9, 27 P.3d 583. 
FN7. This statute has been renumbered and 
revised since the proceedings of this case. 
Throughout this opinion, we apply the 
2005 version of the statute. 
FN8. Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp, 656 P.2d 
409, 410 (Utah 1982) (citations and intern-
al quotation marks omitted). 
FN9. The Adoptive Parents claim that the 
Putative Father falsely asserted that he did 
not know that the Birth Mother was in 
Utah when in fact he did know she was in 
Utah. 
FN1 O.Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)-(B) 
(2008). 
FN11. State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, % 17, 192 
P.3d 867 (emphasis omitted) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
FN 12. Id. H 19 ("When a party fails to pre-
serve an issue for appeal, we will address 
the issue only if (1) the appellant estab-
lishes that the district court committed 
plain error, (2) exceptional circumstances 
exist, or (3) in some situations, if the ap-
pellant raises a claim of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel in failing to preserve the 
issue."(citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
FN13. The record citation is not at all help-
ful because it encompasses the entire re-
cord. 
FN14.Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14 
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FN1S Id § 78-30-4 15(4)(a)-(d) 
FN 16 Ariz Rev Stat § 8-106(G) (2005) 
FN 17 A/ $8-106(G)(7) 
FN 18 Id § 8-106(G)(3) (emphasis added) 
FN19W § 8-106(G)(7), see also id § 
8-106(I)(8) (suggesting that the birth moth-
er include the following language in the 
notice to the putative father "If you do not 
file a paternity action under title 25, 
chapter 6, article 1, Arizona Revised Stat-
utes, and do not serve the mother within 
thirty days after completion of the service 
of this notice and pursue the action to 
judgment, you cannot bring or maintain 
any action to assert any interest in the 
child ") 
FN20 Oman v Davis Sch Dist, 2008 UT 
70, f 35, 194 P3d 956 (quoting State v 
Gallegos 2007 UT 81, 1 12, 171 P 3d 
426) 
FN21 Id 
FN22 Robinson v Mount Logan Clinic, 
LLC, 2008 UT 21, \ 9, 182 P 3d 333 
(citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted) 
FN23 Section 8-106 is entitled, "Consent 
to adoption, who shall consent, waiver, 
consent to the release of information, noti-
fication to potential fathers " 
FN24 Glen v Ohio Sav Bank, 2007 UT 
56,1, 18, 181 P 3d 791 
FN25 Mori v Mori, 931 P 2d 854, 856 
(Utah 1997) (quoting U S Const art IV, § 
1). 
FN26Utah Code Ann $ 78B-15-310 
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FN27 The district court also found two 
more problems with the order 
First, the court found that the order was 
a "nullity" because it was issued after 
the Birth Mother relinquished her rights 
to B G S , and, accordingly the Putative 
Father lost any right to contest the adop-
tion We agree The paternity order was 
a "nullity" as it pertains to whether the 
Putative Father may contest the adoption 
of B G S However, that determination 
does not mean that we decline to give 
the order full faith and credit As our 
analysis indicates, the right to establish 
paternity is a separate and distinct right 
from the right to contest an adoption 
The establishment of paternity is only 
one of many requirements that a putative 
father must satisfy before he establishes 
the right to contest an adoption In this 
case, the Putative Father failed to meet 
the additional requirements, therefore it 
is irrelevant whether he was able to es-
tablish paternity 
Second, the district court stated that the 
order does not "solicit [ ] judicial confid-
ence" for a myriad of tec hnical reasons 
Specifically, the court was concerned 
that the order was not executed by a 
judge, the copy provided to the Utah 
court was not certified, the copy was 
handwritten by the Birth Mother, and the 
order was amended by the Arizona court, 
but the Putative Father failed to present 
the amended order to ihe district court 
None of the reasons stated by the district 
court is supported by evidence that the 
order failed to comply with Arizona law, 
which is the only requirement we must 
consider in a full faith and credit analys-
is Rule 58(a) of the Arizona Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires only that, "all 
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judgments shall be in writing and signed 
by a judge or a court commissioner duly 
authorized to do so "The Paternity Order 
m this case was in writing and signed by 
the deputy clerk No one has argued that 
a deputy clerk is not authorized to sign 
an order Further, no other Arizona re-
quirements have been brought before us 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Ari-
zona requirements have been met 
FN28 In re Complaint Against Smith 925 
P 2d 169, 172 (Utah 1996) (citation and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) 
FN29 Ariz Rev Stat 
(Supp 2008) 
§ 25-l002(3)(a) 
The Adoptive Parents look to Arizona 
Revised Statute sections 25-1031 and 
25-1002 to argue that the Arizona court 
lacked jurisdiction to issue the paternity 
order Section 25-103l(A)(l)-(2) states 
that Arizona does not have jurisdiction 
to "make an initial child custody determ-
ination" unless Arizona is the child's 
home state, and a court of another state 
does not have jurisdiction over the child 
Section 25-1002(4) defines "child cus-
tody proceeding" as "a proceeding, in-
cluding a proceeding for divorce, separa-
tion, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardi-
anship, paternity, termination of parental 
rights and protection from domestic viol-
ence, in which legal custody, physical 
custody or visitation with respect to a 
child is an issue or in which that issue 
may appear "(Emphasis added ) Thus, 
the adoptive parents argue that when the 
Arizona court stated that it lacked juris-
diction to determine custody, it was also 
stating that it lacked jurisdiction to adju-
dicate paternity because a custody pro-
ceeding is statutorily equivalent to a pa-
ternity proceeding However, the juris-
dictional statute regards a "child custody 
determination," not a proceeding Ar-
iz Rev Stat ^ 25-1031(A) Further, the 
definition of a "child custody determina-
tion" does not incorporate a paternity de-
termination a child custody determina-
tion is "any judgment, decree or other 
order of a court, including a permanent, 
temporary, initial and modification or-
der, for legal custody, physical custody 
or visitation with respect to a child "Id % 
25-1002(3)(a) Therefore, a lack of juris-
diction over a custody determination 
does not equate to a lack of jurisdiction 
over a paternity determination 
FN30 State \ Spilleis 2007 UT 13, % 24, 
152 P 3d 315 (alteration in original) 
(quoting State v Evans 2001 UT 22, \ 20, 
20 P 3d 888) 
FN31 Ariz Rev Stat § 8-106(G)(3) (2005) 
FN32W $8-106(G)(6) 
FN33 Id §8-106 
FN34 This situation should not arise in 
Utah because here, "a declaration of pa-
ternity may not be signed or filed after 
consent to or relinquishment for adoption 
has been signed "Utah Code Ann § 
78B-15-302(8) (2008) 
Utah,2009 
H U F v W P W 
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END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
ADDENDUM 2 
Any portion of this Agreement which may be prohibited or unenforceable in any applicable 
jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or 
unenforceability, but shall not invalidate the remaining portions of such provisions or the other 
provisions hereof or affect any such provisions or portion thereof in any other jurisdiction. 
Captions. 
The headings of the sections in this Agreement are intended solely for convenience of reference and 
are not intended and shall not be deemed for any purpose whatsoever to modify or explain or place 
constriction upon any of the provisions of this Agreement 
Governing Law. 
The Parties hereto agree that this Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah 
without regard to the conflicts of law principles. The Parties further agree that exclusive jurisdiction 
and venue to enforce this Agreement shall be in a state or federal court of appropriate jurisdiction in 
Utah. 
Counterparts. 
This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which will be deemed an 
original but all of which together will constitute one and the same document. 
Entire Agreement. 
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties hereto pertaining to the subject 
matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements and understandings of the 
Parties, and there are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in 
connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein. No supplement, 
modification, amendment, waiver or termination of this Agreement shall be binding unless executed 
in writing and signed by the Parties hereto. This Agreement does not supersede, modify or affect 
the Distributor Agreement or the PoUcies and Procedures and MARIN will be bound separately by 
those agreements. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have duly executed this Agreement on the date first written 
9 
ADDENDUM 3 
Westlavu 
Slip Copy Page 1 
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2927768 (D Utah) 
(Cite as: 2006 WL 2927768 (D.Utah)) 
H 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available 
United States District Court, 
D Utah, 
Central Division 
SLICEX, INC , Plaintiff, 
v 
AEROFLEX COLORADO SPRINGS, INC , f/k/a 
Aeroflex UTMC Microelectronic Systems, Inc , 
Defendant 
Civil No. 2:04 CV 00615TS. 
Oct 11,2006 
Jerome Romero, Timothy C Houpt, Ryan M Har-
ris, Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, Salt 
Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff 
David J Jordan, Aaron T Brogdon, David L 
Mortensen, Stoel Rives, Salt Lake City, UT, Lonnie 
Coleman, Kramer Coleman Wactlar & Lieberman, 
Jericho, NY, Raymond M Deeny, N Dawn 
Webber, Sherman & Howard, Colorado Springs, 
CO, for Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
TED STEWART, District Judge 
*1 This matter was tried before the Court on July 
18 through 21, 2006, the Honorable Ted Stewart 
presiding With regard to plaintiff SliceX, Inc fs 
("SliceX") second claim for relief, the Court, hav-
ing reviewed the evidence, listened to the testi-
mony, and heard the arguments presented by the 
parties, and being fully advised in this matter, 
hereby enters the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Background 
1 SliceX is a Utah corporation that has at all times 
relevant to this dispute been in the business of 
providing analog and mixed-signal design services 
(Trial Transcript ("Transcript") at 91 7-11 ) 
2 Defendant Aeroflex Colorado Springs, Inc 
("Aeroflex") is a Colorado-based corporation in the 
business of designing and developing mixed-signal 
integrated circuits (Id at 270 1-23 ) 
3 Aeroflex contracts with various customers for the 
design and fabrication of mixed signal circuits (See 
Transcript at 271 16-272 7 ) 
4 Aeroflex at times contracts with outside engin-
eering firms to secure engineering services (Id at 
272 8-12 )Aeroflex relies on a combination of those 
outside contract engineers and its own m-house en-
gineering resources to meet the contractual dead-
lines set by its customers (Id at 273 3-18 )Relying 
on outside contract engineers is often necessary to 
avoid overstaffing during non-peak periods but car-
ries with it certain disadvantages, such as higher 
cost and diminished control over the pace and pro-
gress of the work (See id) 
B. The Parties' Duties and Performance under 
the Agreements 
5 In order to meet contractual obligations to cus-
tomers, Aeroflex engaged SliceX to provide certain 
engineering services under three consulting agree-
ments dated (a) November 1, 2002, (b) February 
12, 2003, and (c) October 23, 2003, (collectively, 
the "Agreements") (See Trial Exs 1, 3, 5) 
6 In the Agreements, SliceX agreed to provide spe-
cified engineering services, and Aeroflex agreed to 
pay SliceX for the services provided in accordance 
with the rates set forth in the Agreements (See 
id) Specifically, the Agreements described the 
parties' agreed-upon performances as follows 
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a In the November 1, 2002 Agreement 
1) Services and Compensation 
a) ShceX, Inc agrees to perform for UTMC the ser-
vices described in Attachment I ("Services") 
b) The UTMC agrees to pay ShceX, Inc the com-
pensation set forth m Attachment I for the perform-
ance of the Services 
b In the February 12, 2003 Agreement 
1) Services and Compensation 
a) ShceX, Inc agrees to perform for AEROFLEX 
UTMC the services described in Attachment I 
("Development Work") 
b) The AEROFLEX UTMC agrees to pay ShceX, 
Inc the compensation set forth in Attachment I for 
the performance of the Development Work 
c In the October 23, 2003 Agreement 
1) Services and Compensation 
a) ShceX, Inc agrees to perform for AEROFLEX 
the services described in Attachment I 
("Development Work") 
*2 AEROFLEX agrees to pay ShceX, Inc the com-
pensation set forth in Attachment I for the perform-
ance of the Development Work 
(Trial Exs 1,3,5 at H 1 ) 
7 The Agreements also contained express terms 
governing Aeroflex's conduct with regard to the 
hiring of individuals working for ShceX 
a The November 1, 2002 Agreement provided as 
follows 
UTMC agrees that UTMC shall not, for a period of 
three years immediately following the termination 
of this agreement, whether directly or indirectly 
(b) solicit or take away, or attempt to solicit or take 
away, any employee of ShceX, Inc , either for UT-
MC's own benefit or for the benefit of any other 
person or entity 
b The February 12, 2003 Agreement provided as 
follows 
AEROFLEX UTMC agrees that AEROFLEX UT-
MC shall not, for a period of three years immedi-
ately following the termination of this agreement, 
whether directly or indirectly (b) solicit or take 
away, or attempt to solicit or take away, any em-
ployee of ShceX, Inc , either for AEROFLEX UT-
MC's own benefit or for the benefit of any other 
person or entity 
c Finally, the October 23, 2003 Agreement 
provided as follows 
AEROFLEX agrees not to solicit or entice (other 
than normal employment discussions not initiated 
by AEROFLEX) for employment any of the current 
employees of ShceX for purposes of hiring such 
employee during the period of this Agreement and 
for a period of one year thereafter, without the prior 
written consent of ShceX 
(Trial Ex 1 at \ 4, Trial Ex 3 at \ 5, Trial Ex 5 at 
14) 
2 Each of the Agreements also provided that Aer-
oflex was permitted to terminate the respective 
agreement for any or no reason upon giving notice 
to ShceX (See Trial Ex 1 at U 6(b), Trial Ex 3 at 1) 
7(b), Trial Ex 5 at K 6(b)) 
3 Aeroflex fully performed under the Agreements, 
it paid for all of the services pro\ ided by ShceX 
(See, e g, Transcript at 200 5-201 c>) 
C. Aeroflex's Decision to Open a Grass Valley 
Facility 
4 In 2003, Aeroflex learned that SliceX was exper 
lencing significant financial difficalties and losing 
many of its employees (Id at 285 \3-2Q,see also 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting De 
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fendant's Rule 52(c) Motion (the "Order") at 11.) 
SliceX had furloughed several Grass Valley em-
ployees, had placed the rest on 50% salary, and was 
adjusting some employees' salaried/hourly status to 
reduce its payroll expenses. (Transcript at 
155:24-156:1, 387-88, 413:20-414:2, 415:19-416:8, 
448:16-18, 452:14-20, 469:12-19; Trial Exs. B, E.) 
From time to time, SliceX missed its payroll and 
failed to reimburse its employees in a timely fash-
ion for work-related expenses. (Id. at 391:10-22, 
413:24-414:2, 415:8-15, 471:4-472:8.)As a result, 
the majority of SliceX's Grass Valley engineers left 
for other employment between the summer of 2003 
and early spring of 2004. (Id. at 157-159, 
390-9Usee also id. at 180:6-9.) 
*3 5. Upon learning of SliceX's problems, Aeroflex 
grew concerned that SliceX might become unable 
to complete the services it had agreed to perform, 
potentially causing Aeroflex to miss its own con-
tractual deadlines. (See Transcript at 285:13-20; 
Order at 11.) 
6. As a result, Aeroflex was forced to consider al-
ternative means of satisfying its contractual obliga-
tions with regard to the contracts for which it had 
retained SliceX's services. (See Transcript at 
286:5-23; Trial Ex. 15 at 1; Order at 11.) Specific-
ally, Aeroflex began exploring the possibility of 
opening its own design facility in Grass Valley, 
California, either by acquisition or by assembling 
its own design team. (See Transcript at 286:5-23; 
Trial Ex. 15 at 1; Order at 11.) 
7. After considering its options, Aeroflex concluded 
that continuing to depend on SliceX was too risky 
and would not give Aeroflex an acceptable level of 
control over the pace of the work. (See Transcript at 
285:8-20, 286:24-287:7, 290:19-23; Trial Ex. 15.) 
Aeroflex decided that its best course of action was 
to establish its own design facility to ensure that it 
could meet its contractual deadlines. (Id. at 287:1-7, 
290:14-18, 291:1-4; Order at 12.) 
D. Aeroflex's Hiring of Former SliceX Employ-
ees 
8. Thereafter, Aeroflex ran a series of job postings 
on Monster.com beginning in late 2003 and running 
through the spring of 2004. (Transcript at 300-301; 
Order at 12.) 
9. Among other applicants, four individuals who 
were then working for SliceX, Jackie Snyder 
("Snyder"), Steve Levy ("Levy"), David Rosky 
("Rosky"), and Tom Grundy ("Grundy"), respon-
ded to Aeroflex's Monster.com posting and/or in-
quired about positions with Aeroflex. (Transcript at 
305:13-306:17, 392:11-19, 424:8-11, 473:19-24; 
Order at 12.) 
10. SliceX's financial problems had led Snyder to 
look for new employment, and she found and re-
sponded to Aeroflex's February 2004 Monster.com 
advertisement in the course of her job search. 
(Transcript at 392:5-16.) No one directed her to 
Aeroflex's job posting. (Id. at 392:17-19.)Aeroflex 
did not inform her of the posting or solicit her ap-
plication, and no one at Aeroflex asked her to re-
cruit others to work at Aeroflex. (Id. at 394:1-3, 
395:25-396:2.)After reviewing her application, 
Aeroflex interviewed Snyder, but she withdrew 
from consideration after deciding to accept employ-
ment at Intel. (Id. at 395:6-24.) 
11. Levy had also decided to look for alternative 
employment due to SliceX's financial struggles. 
(Transcript at 421:15-422:10.) He conducted his 
search by talking to friends in the industry, and as 
part of his search, he went to Monster.com to ex-
plore possible opportunities in his area. (Id. at 
422-24.)While prospecting on Monster.com, Levy 
found Aeroflex's posting and submitted an electron-
ic application. (Id. at 424:8-11; Trial Ex. Ul.) Levy 
interviewed with Aeroflex and eventually accepted 
a position. (Id. at 425:20-23.)Levy found Aeroflex's 
Monster.com job posting on his own; no one at 
Aeroflex informed him of or directed him to the 
posting. (Id. at 306:2-9, 428:7-12.)Aeroflex did not 
solicit Levy to apply and did not request that he re-
cruit or inform others of the opportunity after he 
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had applied (Id at 428 7-14, 429 6-12 ) 
*4 12 ShceX's financial struggles also led Rosky, 
Levy's longtime personal friend, to seek new em-
ployment in early 2004 (Transcript at 
452 21-453 7, 16-17) Over the course of several 
months, Levy and Rosky discussed their respective 
job searches, and upon learning that Levy had ap-
plied for a position at Aeroflex, Rosky contacted 
David Kerwin ("Kerwin"), Aeroflex's Director of 
Mixed-Signal Products, to inquire about the possib-
ility of working for Aeroflex as an independent 
consultant (Id at 453 16-454 6 )Rosky initiated 
this inquiry (Id at 454 9-15 )No one at Aeroflex 
contacted him to solicit him (Id) 
13 Finally, Grundy also decided to leave ShceX 
due for compensation-related reasons (Transcript 
at 473 15-18) Grundy's job search, like Snyder's 
and Levy's, included searching Monster com for job 
postings (Id at 473 20-24 )He also found Aer-
oflex's posting and submitted a resume electronic-
ally (Id at 473 25-474 4 )Grundy found Aeroflex's 
posting with no prompting from anyone at Aer-
oflex, and no one at Aeroflex solicited him to seek 
employment at Aeroflex prior to his submission of 
a resume (Id at 473 20-474 2, 477 4-8 )Like 
Rosky, Grundy eventually contracted with Aeroflex 
as an independent consultant (Id at 478 6-8 ) 
14 Based on the evidence presented and testimony 
heard, the Court finds that no one at Aeroflex told 
Snyder, Levy, Rosky, or Grundy about Aeroflex's 
Monster com posting, and no one at Aeroflex soli-
cited these individuals for employment (See Tran-
script at 392 17-19, 394 1-3, 306 2-9, 428 7-12, 
428 7-14, 429 6-12, 454 9-15, 473 20-474 2, 
477 4-8, see also Order at 12 ) Rather, the Court 
finds that each of these former ShceX employees 
initiated employment discussions with Aeroflex by 
either responding to the Monster com job posting or 
contacting Aeroflex on his or her own, without as-
sistance or prompting from anyone at Aeroflex 
(See Transcript at 342 3-17, 392 17-19, 394 1-3, 
428 7-14, 429 6-12, 477 4-8, see also Order at 12 ) 
15 Based on the evidence presented and testimony 
heard, the Court finds that each of these four engin 
eers initiated contact with Aeroflex and that Aer 
oflex took no steps to solicit any of these former 
ShceX employees (See Transcript at 342 3-17, 
392 17-19, 394 1-3, 428 7-14, 429 6-12, 477 4-8, 
Order at 12-13) 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Utah Law Imposes an Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
1 Under Utah law, every contract is deemed to in 
elude an implied covenant of good faith and fan 
dealing, which prevents each party to the contract 
from " 'intentionally or purposely do[ing] anything 
which will destroy or injure the oiher party's right 
to receive the fruits of [the] contract' " St Bene 
diet's Dev Co v St Benedict'* Hosp 811 P 2d 
194, 199 (Utah 1991) 
2 To succeed on a claim for breach of the implied 
covenant, a plaintiff must show that the defendant 
"intentionally or purposefully de feat[ed] the [the 
plaintiffs] expectations " Rawson v Conover, 20 
P 3d 876, 885 (Utah 2001) 
B. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing Cannot Be Used to Impose New, Inde-
pendent Duties upon Aeroflex. 
*5 3 "While a covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing inheres in almost every contract, some general 
principles limit the scope of the covenant" Oak 
wood Village LLC v Albertsons, Inc, 2004 UT 
101, \ 45, 104 P2d 1226 These include, but are 
not limited to, the following 
a "First, this covenant cannot be read to establish 
new, independent rights or duties to which the 
parties did not agree ex ante "Id (citing Brehanv v 
Nordstiom, Inc, 812 P 2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991), see 
also Seare v Umv of Utah Sch o) Med, 882 P 2d 
673, 678 (Utah 1994), Sanderson v Fust Sec Leas-
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ing Co 844 P 2d 303, 308 (Utah 1992) 
b "Second, this covenant cannot create rights and 
duties inconsistent with express contractual terms " 
OakMood Village 2004 UT 101 11 45, 104 P 2d 
1226 (citing Btehany 812 P 2d at 55, Rio Algom 
Coip \ Junto Ltd 618 P 2d 497, 505 (Utah 
1980)) 
c "Finally, [courts] will not use this covenant to 
achieve an outcome in harmony with the court's 
sense of justice but inconsistent with the express 
terms of the applicable contract "Id (citing Dal/on 
\ Jenco Consti Co 642 P 2d 748, 750 (Utah 
1982), see also Etme Haite Ford Inc v / ord Mo 
tot Co 260 F3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir 2001) (The 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
"cannot override an express contractual term ") 
4 In short, courts "will not interpret the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to make a 
better contract for the parties than they made for 
themselves Nor will [courts] construe the covenant 
to establish new, independent rights or duties not 
agreed upon by the parties " Mahbu In\ Co v 
Sparks 2000 UT 30, \ 19, 996 P 2d 1043 (quoting 
Btonn v Mooie 973 P 2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998)) 
(other citations omitted) 
FNlSee also Seme 882 P 2d at 678 
(citations omitted) (The implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing is "implied 
in contracts 'to protect the express coven-
ants or promises of the contract '"), Rubin 
v Laser 703 N E 2d 453, 459 
(111 Ct App 1998) ("[T]he doctrine of good 
faith and fair dealing does not serve to im-
port new obligations into a contract It 
merely controls how the obligations stated 
within the contract are to be performed "), 
First v Allstate Ins Co 222 F Supp 2d 
1165, 1172 (CDCal2002) ("Absent a 
contractual right the implied covenant 
has nothing upon which to act as a supple-
ment, and should not be endowed with an 
existence independent of its contractual 
underpinnings"), Menpeco US4 Inc v 
Snm Bank Corp 237 BR 12, 26 
(S D N Y 1997) ("The implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing does not 
provide a court carte blanche to rewrite the 
parties' agreement Thus, a court cannot 
imply a covenant inconsistent with the 
terms expressly set forth in the contract ") 
5 The Court notes that courts in other jurisdictions 
have also held that "a party which acts in accord-
ance with rights expressly provided in a contract 
cannot be held liable for breaching an implied cov-
enant of good faith " Menpeco 237 B R at 26,^^ 
also An and Co Inc v Regent Intl Corp 273 
F Supp 2d 518, 522 (S D N Y 2003) (A claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is "redundant where the conduct al-
legedly violating the implied covenant is also the 
predicate for breach of an express provision of 
the underlying contract") (citations omitted), Flat 
ris v Ptovident Lije & Accident Ins Co 310 F 3d 
73, 81 (2d Cir 2002), Alter v Bogoncin 1997 WL 
691332 at *7 (S D N Y 1997) The Court notes that 
ShceX has failed to articulate any implied duty 
owed by Aeroflex other than those expressly im-
posed under the parties' agreement Indeed, ShceX's 
claim for breach of the implied covenant is predic-
ated on the same factual averments that form the 
basis of its breach of contract claim that Aeroflex 
improperly solicited ShceX employees (See Com-
plaint \ 20 (constituting ShceX's entire Second 
Cause of Action "The conduct of Aeroflex as out-
lined above [in support of ShceX's breach of con-
tract claim] has breached the Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing implied in the Agree-
ments ")) 
*6 6 Here, the parties' contractual rights and oblig-
ations were clearly defined in the Agreements 
a The Agreements described the work to be done 
by ShceX and specified the rate of compensation 
due from Aeroflex (See Fact \ 2, Trial Exs 1,3, 
5) 
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b. The Agreements contained express provisions 
governing the hiring of SliceX's employees by Aer-
oflex. (See Order at 4-7; Trial Ex. 1 at K 4; Trial Ex. 
3 at K 5; Trial Ex. 5 at ^4.) 
c. Aeroflex had the right to terminate the Agree-
ments at any time upon giving notice to SliceX. 
(See Fact % 4; Trial Ex. 1 at U 6(b); Trial Ex. 3 at % 
7(b); Trial Ex. 5 at U 6(b).) 
d. Aeroflex had no contractual obligation under the 
Agreements to not open a competing design facil-
ity. (See Trial Exs. 1,3,5.) 
e. Aeroflex had no duty to leave its design work 
with SliceX beyond the terms of the Agreements or 
to the derogation of its express right to terminate. 
(See Trial Exs. 1,3,5.) 
7. The Court may not impose duties on Aeroflex in 
addition to those expressly provided in the Agree-
ments. 
C. Aeroflex Did Not Breach the Implied Coven-
ant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
8. Based on the evidence presented and testimony 
heard at trial, the Court therefore finds that: 
a. Aeroflex's retention of SliceX was "at will" un-
der the Agreements, and SliceX's legal expectation 
was to receive compensation for whatever design 
services it performed. 
b. Aeroflex fully performed its obligations under 
the Agreements by paying SliceX in full for all ser-
vices rendered and took no other actions to interfere 
with SliceX's performance under the Agreements. 
c. Because Aeroflex had the unfettered right to ter-
minate the Agreements at will by giving notice, 
SliceX understood that it might not be retained to 
perform all of the work set forth in the Agreements. 
(See Fact K 4; Trial Ex. 1 at % 6(b); Trial Ex. 3 at K 
7(b); Trial Ex. 5 at f 6(b).) 
d. SliceX's failure to generate sufficient business to 
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pay and/or retain its employees justifiably gener-
ated concern on the part of Aeroflex. 
e. SliceX had no legal expectation of additional 
work from Aeroflex beyond the terms of the Agree-
ments. 
f. SliceX received its bargained-for consideration 
and enjoyed the fruits of the Agreements. (See Fact 
15 . ) 
g. Aeroflex's posting of openings on Monster.com 
did not breach the non-solicitation clauses of the 
Agreements. 
9. Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes 
that Aeroflex did not breach the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing and that SliceX can-
not prevail on its second claim for relief, which is 
premised on the assertion that Aeroflex improperly 
solicited individuals employed by SliceX. 
10. Thus, judgment is hereby entered in Aeroflex's 
favor on SliceX's claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that 
claim is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
D.Utah,2006. 
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